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Abstract: Multiple actors across different institutional levels play a role in water governance.
The coordination of these actors is important for effective water governance. However, the joining
together of multiple actors can have several implications, such as a redistribution of power across
actors, a change in democratic control and citizen influence as well as shifting accountability structures.
These implications can involve different barriers and bridges that might impede or foster coordination.
Through qualitative and quantitative methods, we assess the following barriers and bridges for
coordination: (1) reputational power in terms of who is perceived as important for coordination in
the water sector; (2) democratic legitimacy in terms of actors’ value of local control of water services;
and (3) accountability in terms of the regional actors’ capacity to steer in the water sector. This article
focuses on three cases in a Swiss region that has experienced water provision challenges due to its
highly fragmented water supply structures. We find that reputational power serves as a bridge in
our three cases: when the actors responsible for water supply regard potential coordination partners
as important, then we observe coordination. In contrast, we do not find conclusive evidence to
support the assumption that a fear of losing local control is a barrier for coordination. Instead, our
results indicate that accountability, in the form of vertical steering by the regional actors, serves as a
bridge for coordination, and that this could help mitigate some of the potentially negative effects of
democratic legitimacy perceptions: through convening local actors or providing positive incentives
to municipalities to work together, regional actors can foster coordination.
Keywords: coordination; water supply; social network analysis
1. Introduction
Water systems are experiencing highly dynamic and conflicting societal demands and
environmental pressures [1]. Many of the prevailing and looming water crises are not necessarily due
to water scarcity or a lack of technological expertise, but rather because of poor management and
governance of available water resources and infrastructure [2,3]. The inability of current systems to
address these issues has led to calls for increased coordination among key actors [4]. Multiple actors,
both public and private, across different institutional levels, from local to international, play a role in
water governance. On the one hand, typically municipalities have been delegated the responsibility to
provide water services in cities [1]. On the other hand, regional, national and international as well as
private actors may play an important role in terms of oversight, technical knowledge and funding.
In this paper, we consider coordination as the joining of two or more actors in providing water
services. Coordination often initially involves actors at the same jurisdictional level [5]. Going beyond
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this, coordination typically entails a whole network of organizations and entities that decide on and
provide public tasks, rather than single public actors. This network of actors belongs to the public and
private sphere and includes actors from different jurisdictional levels [6–10]. In short, coordination
aims at establishing structures to enhance cooperation among a variety of actors to co-manage service
provision [11–13]. We focus on “observable” coordination in the form of existing organizational
structures, such as inter-municipal associations, through which actors jointly provide water services.
Different barriers and bridges might impede or foster coordination across multiple actors in the
water sector. In this contribution, we focus on three aspects: reputational power, democratic legitimacy
and accountability.
Firstly, coordination involves a redistribution of power amongst actors. Either municipal actors
have to delegate a degree of power to an inter-municipal form of coordination or they might delegate
this to regional (e.g., constituent state), private or even national actors. Therefore, a potentially
important precondition for coordination among actors is the degree to which actors perceive each other
as important and, hence, powerful [14–16]. Ideally, coordination could occur across levels (municipal,
regional or national as well as public and private). However, as municipal actors historically play
an important role in the provision of water provision [1], a first step would be the inter-municipal
coordination. Hence, regarding fellow municipalities as important would arguably play a critical role
for coordination. Following this, our first expectation is that if actors responsible for water provision
regard other municipalities as important, then this serves as a bridge for coordination.
Second, coordination can be opposed at the local level, often because of citizens’ and local
politicians’ participation concerns [17,18]. Indeed, urban water provision has traditionally enjoyed a
high degree of citizen influence. With coordination reforms, the concern emerges that decision-making
is no longer democratically legitimated if citizens can neither directly make decisions nor elect
the people who manage their utilities [19,20]. This relates to democratic legitimacy, where direct
and representative democratic elements such as citizens’ influence on public decision-making are
considered key for acceptable policies [21]. Hence, strong democratic legitimacy, that is local actors’
value of democratic control, may hinder coordination [17,18]. A perceived democratic deficit at the
local level has been found to be a barrier for coordination [18]. This leads us to our second expectation:
Strong democratic legitimacy, and thus, actors’ value of local influence on service provision is a barrier
for coordination.
Third, accountability mechanisms, such as the legal mandates traditionally fulfilled by public
authorities, play an important role for coordination reforms [22,23]. The broader water governance
literature typically defines accountability as a determinant of water sector performance [24]. Generally,
the literature links accountability to hierarchical control, that is, the accountability of water officials
to democratic institutions, as specified in water laws [23]. Hence, accountability is often tied to
the degree of regulation for water quality, infrastructure maintenance, etc. [25]. The literature on
accountability identifies many other (less hierarchical and less formal) accountability mechanisms,
based on reputation and internal discretion such as accountability through the professional norms,
media, and consumer choice [22,26,27]. For the purposes of this article, we focus on formal, hierarchical
means of accountability. In federalist systems, the locus of accountability is typically at the regional
level, as the municipalities must account to the regional water laws and officials [28]. We thus argue
that the regional level has a capacity to steer the local or municipal level. Through this steering
role, regional actors can support coordination through subsidies or mandates. Hence, a bridge for
coordination may be strong accountability, where the government’s capacity to steer is desired and
it has the necessary tools to do so [6,7,18]. Our third expectation is thus: Accountability, and thus a
strong (perceived) capacity of the region to steer serves as a bridge for coordination.
Empirically, we assess these expectations in the water supply sector in Switzerland, which
provides an interesting case to study coordination between municipalities and the regions (cantons) in
a federal system. Switzerland’s key peculiarities of direct democracy make it an extreme case to study
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democratic legitimacy and accountability issues. The water sector is salient for such an analysis of
coordination, as it is characterized by high fragmentation [29].
The aim of this article is firstly to identify the degrees of coordination in the Swiss water supply
sector and then shed light onto the bridges and barriers for such coordination. To do so, we proceed
in four parts. We first specify our case selection and methods. In the empirical part, we then
identify observed coordination by local and regional actors. Next, we outline the reputational power
constellations using Social Network Analysis (SNA), and then assess legitimacy and accountability
in the case studies. After discussing these results comparatively, we finally conclude with some
suggestions for future research trajectories.
2. Materials and Methods
We have purposively selected the jurisdiction of the canton (region) Basel-Landschaft, in
Switzerland, to conduct an analysis of the water supply sector because it has fragmented structures,
but pursues coordination processes. Increasing water quality and quantity demands as well as climatic
variations have led to growing challenges for these small water supply organizations to meet policy
goals. In an effort to improve their performance, the region has driven processes of coordination, but
the municipalities have largely resisted these reforms.
We have selected three case study areas within Basel-Landschaft that face different challenges:
Case 1 includes 18 municipalities and is peri-urban with water quality concerns in the context of
flooding and droughts. Case 1 spans a hydrogeological “water region” that cuts across canton
Basel-Landschaft and the neighboring canton Solothurn. This is why we have included the canton of
Solothurn in the interviews (see Appendix B). Case 2 encompasses eight municipalities and is rural
with water quantity challenges, as hillside municipalities experience water shortages during droughts
and are dependent on the water-rich valley municipalities. Case 3 spans 19 municipalities, is urban,
and faces water quality concerns due to the river Rhine and nearby industrial deposits. Case 3 spans a
hydrogeological “water region” that cuts across canton Basel-Landschaft and neighboring cantons,
Basel City and Solothurn. This is why we have included the latter two cantons in the interviews
(see Appendix B).
Our data comprise archival and documentary sources (laws and regulations) on the one hand,
and 23 semi-structured, in-person interviews on the other hand. Appendix B contains the list of the
interviewees. The interviews were conducted between June 2013 and February 2014, lasted between
60 and 90 min, and were recorded and transcribed.
To operationalize our dependent variable, we assessed the extent to which coordination is
occurring in the cases. We did this based on an analysis of the existing organizational structures
in terms of legal forms. That is, we first looked at the number of inter-municipal associations or
joint-stock corporations through which the local actors jointly provide water services. Second, we also
asked interview partners about ongoing processes to increase coordination. Third, we conducted a
qualitative assessment about who retains decision-making competence. A high degree of coordination
is defined as a situation with only a single inter-municipal organization where the local, municipal
level retains little control. A low level of coordination is when the municipalities each operate their
own water service system. A moderate degree of coordination involves a mix of inter-municipal
associations, joint-stock-corporations and individual municipal waterworks.
The subsequent research steps involved document analysis and semi-structured interviews.
To assess reputational power, we identified the key actors in all three cases. We did this by pinpointing
the leading agency responsible for water services at the regional level, as well as one project leader at
the local level as the two starting points for our snowball sampling. Through scoping interviews with
these actors per region, we identified additional actors, whom we also interviewed. This resulted in 8
interview partners for Case 1 and 9 interview partners in both Cases 2 and 3. We systematically asked
these actors (called “the core”) whom they perceived as important actors for water supply. In this way,
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we were able to compile a list of 52, 46 and 42 collective actors and organizations, respectively, coding
them by their jurisdictional level (local, regional, national) and sector (private or public).
To assess the reputational power of single actors in the network, we based our analysis on two
measures borrowed from Social Network Analysis (SNA). SNA assumes that formal and informal
arrangements and the involvement of a variety of actors are crucial for coordination [30]. In this
context, we define nodes in the network as public and private, including local, regional and national
organizations that are involved in the water supply sector (be it through management, regulation,
or supply and consumption). A tie in the network is drawn as soon as an organization mentions
another organization as important. It is thus a so-called directed network. We first calculate network
density per case and, thus, the share of observed relations compared to all possible relations in one
network [31]. Yet density is very sensitive to response rates in a network and to node-number per
network [32]. This is why we predominantly concentrated on the densities within our core networks,
as we have full data on these (all interview partners). Densities of the core indicate whether what we
initially identified as the most important actors in the cases are also perceived as such by the concerned
actors. In-degree centrality, that is the number of times the same actor is mentioned several times by
various interview partners, is the second indicator for reputational power. The more the same set of
actors are mentioned as being important (having high in-degree centrality), the more they are, thus,
tightly linked to the core of the network. Network densities and in-degree centralities were calculated
using UCINET 6.0 software.
We first measured democratic legitimacy in terms of citizens’ rights to elect those responsible for
service provision into office and to vote on projects and expenditure [20,33]. This provides us with an
indication of the formal democratic legitimacy as specified in the legislation. We then further assessed
legitimacy by asking interview partners how they perceive citizen influence and local competence in
relation to water service provision. That is, whether they value having a high degree of democratic
influence, which includes local competences and control over water services, and how this serves as a
bridge or barrier for coordination. This second component of the legitimacy analysis enables us to
identify the perceived democratic legitimacy in relation to bridges and barriers for coordination. We
realize that the formal and informal (values) may be interlinked, but what is interesting is that the
formal democratic legitimacy is constant across the three cases and the values are different.
Finally, we assessed accountability in terms of the degree of the regional government’s capacity to
steer [21]. Again, to identify the formal mechanisms, we first analyzed the relevant laws to pinpoint
the type of steering tools that the regional (cantonal) actors have vis-à-vis municipalities. We defined
steering tools as including planning processes, making recommendations, issuing mandates and
fines, denying concessions, or providing subsidies. We then asked interview partners about which
instruments are actually employed and how they perceive the regional government’s capacity to
steer, whether they prefer stronger or weaker steering and how the regional government’s capacity to
steer serves as bridges or barriers for coordination. We define stronger tools as those with more force
(e.g., denying concessions, giving fines or subsidies) and weaker tools as those with less force (e.g.,
making recommendations, planning processes). Again, we realize that the formally possible and the
actually employed and perceived accountability mechanisms may be interlinked. However, and again,
the former is constant across the three cases and the latter are different.
3. Results
3.1. Coordination
The organizational analysis shows that Case 1 has a moderate degree of coordination, as there are
five municipal water suppliers, one municipal waterworks that supplies additional municipalities,
three inter-municipal associations and one inter-municipal joint-stock corporation (see Table 1).
According to our interviews, we found that the inter-municipal organizations have been constructed
in such a way that the municipalities have retained a high degree of control, as the individual
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municipalities can strongly affect the decisions. The municipalities running their own waterworks
have been involved in a process to join in a new organizational form, but this has not materialized
thus far.
Table 1. Overview of water suppliers and types in Case 1.
Name Type
1. Wahlen Municipality Municipal water works
2. Dittingen Municipality Municipal water works
3. Kleinlützel Municipality Municipal water works
4. Röschenz Municipality Municipal water works
5. Liesberg Municipality Municipal water works
6. City of Laufen Municipal water works, but supplies three municipalities
7. Water Federation Birstal Inter-municipal association (task-specific association for water supply)
8. Lüsseltaler Water Association Inter-municipal association (task-specific association for water supply)
9. Water Supply Gilgenberg Inter-municipal association (task-specific association for water supply)
10. Regional Water Supply Birstal-Thierstein Inter-municipal joint-stock corporation (stockholders are all public)
Case 2 involves high coordination: there is one inter-municipal joint-stock corporation that
serves as a water distributor between the municipalities across the entire case area (see Table 2).
The municipalities retain only a minimal degree of influence as delegates sit on the board of directors.
The corporation owns the reservoirs and regional distribution pipes, while the municipalities own
their own water supply structure and retain water rights. There has been a process to integrate the
municipalities further into the corporation (through joint-ownership and joint water rights) but this
has not been successful thus far.
Table 2. Overview of water suppliers and types in Case 2.
Name Type
Water Supply Waldenburgertal
Inter-municipal joint-stock corporation (all stockholders are public)
Redistribution of water between municipalities as follows:
Water supplying municipalities: Hölstein, Oberdorf, Niederdof
Water receiving municipalities: Arboldswil, Bennwil, Lampenberg,
Ramlinsburg, Waldenburg
Like Case 1, Case 3 has a moderate degree of coordination, as there are four municipal waterworks,
two inter-municipal associations, and one inter-municipal joint-stock corporation (see Table 3).
A process to increase coordination by joining all waterworks together has been underway, but has failed
to date. Comparatively, the degree of coordination is slightly higher in Case 3 than Case 1, as there are
fewer organizational forms, despite having slightly more municipalities (19 vs. 18 municipalities).
Table 3. Overview of water suppliers and types in Case 3.
Name Type
1. Münchenstein Municipality Municipal water works
2. Arlesheim Municipality Municipal water works
3. Birsfelden Municipality Municipal water works
4. Muttenz Municipality Municipal water works
5. Task-specific association Waterworks Reinach Region Inter-municipal association (task-specific association for water supply)
6. Task-specific association Aesch, Dornach and Pfeffingen
(Basel-Landschaft and Solothurn) Inter-municipal association (task-specific association for water supply)
7. Joint-stock company Hardwasser AG Inter-municipal joint-stock corporation (all stockholders are public)
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3.2. Reputational Power
By asking core actors at the local and regional level about whom they perceive as important in the
water supply sector of Basel-Landschaft, we found that national actors are not perceived as playing a
prominent role in water service provision. The regional actors, the municipalities and inter-municipal
organizations enjoy the highest reputational power. Private actors, such as consultancies, do not play a
central role. However, both the regional actors and the municipalities contract them to accomplish
tasks and enjoy a degree of reputational power.
Table 4 summarizes data about the core actors in each case who we interviewed as well as all
the actors named as important in the case. We specify the share of local, regional, national and
public–private actors as well as two network measures, in-degree centrality and densities. Density is
an appropriate measure for the core of the network: All interview partners comprising this core had
the opportunity to mention all other interview partners as important actors. In this local and very
sector-specific context, one can expect that potentially important actors know each other. This is why a
density in the core below 50% can be considered as low, and everything above 50% can be considered
as high. The maximum density would be 1. The in-degree centrality then shows how many times local
actors, such as municipalities or waterworks, were mentioned to be important and are, thus, connected
to the core of the network. One word of caution concerning the density measure of the whole network:
these are not complete networks, meaning that only one-fifth of the actors in the network actually gave
their judgments about whom they perceive as important (but we controlled for this when calculating
densities). This picture could look very different if at least 50% of all actors in these networks had
answered the question about whom they perceive as important. However, these network constellations
provide us with insight regarding who the relevant actors are for coordination processes.
Table 4. Reputational power in three cases.
Total
Number
of Actors
Local Regional National Private
Avg.
In-Degree
Local
Density
Case 1
Core 8 6 (75%) 2 (25%) 0 0 5.5 80%
All 52 26 (50%) 10 (23%) 6 (14%) 7 (16%) 2.4 30%
Case 2
Core 9 8 (88%) 1 (11%) 0 0 5.6 65%
All 46 21 (46%) 12 (26%) 6 (13%) 7 (15%) 3.71 32%
Case 3
Core 9 7 (78%) 2 (22%) 0 0 4.86 50%
All 42 21 (50%) 12 (29%) 5 (12%) 4 (9%) 3.14 26%
Case 1 is the biggest network compared to the others. Fifty percent of the actors perceived as
important in the water sector are local actors (red nodes) and 23% are regional (cantonal) actors
(turquoise nodes). The local actors are only loosely connected to the core (average in-degree centrality
of 2.4, Table 4, Case 1; see also Table A1 in the Appendix A). Interestingly, the interview partners
prominently perceive regional actors (Table A1 in Appendix A; and turquoise nodes in Figure 1) as
important players in the water sector in Case 1. The national actors (blue nodes) and the private actors
(orange nodes) are far fewer and generally (with two exceptions) at the periphery of the network and,
hence, have a low degree of reputational power.
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Figure 1. Power in Case 1. Legend: Having 8 interview partners and 52 actors in this network, 408
connections are possible, and 124 were observed, which results in a density of 0.30. The overall density
(consi ering all potential relations if all the nodes had been active) is 0.047. Red = municipal/local;
Turquoise = cantonal/regional; Blue = national; Orange = private.
Similar to Case 1, in Case 2 almost half of the actors that were mentioned as being important for
water supply were local actors and 26% (red nodes) were regional actors (turquoise nodes; Figure 2).
In contrast to Case 1, a key aspect in Case 2 is that the local actors are well connected to the core (average
in-degree centrality of 3.71, Table 4, Case 2; see also Table A2 in Appendix A and red nodes at the center
of Figure 2) whereas regional actors (turquoise nodes; Figure 2) are not considered very important. In
contrast to Case 1, more national actors (blue nodes) are ide tified as important, but generally at the
periphery. The private actors (orange nodes) are fewer and at the periphery with low importance.
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Figure 2. Power in Case 2. Legend: Having 9 interview partners and 46 actors in this network, 414
connections are possible, and 132 were observed, which results in a density of 0.32. The overall density
(considering all potential relations if all the nodes had been active) is 0.064. Red = municipal/local;
Turquoise = cantonal/regional; Blue = national; Orange = private.
Like the ot er two cases, the intervie artners m inly med local actors (red nodes) as
important for water p ovision (50 able 4, Case 3) in Case 3. How ver, the e is a separation
into a divided core–periphery structure (see Figure 3): one consisting of municipal actors (red nodes)
and the other of mainly regional actors (turquoise nodes). Municipal actors in the periphery only link
to municipal actors in the core, and regional actors in the periphery only link to regional actors in the
core. Furthermore, regional actors also build a cluster internally linked to each other. Here we find
that regional and local actors do not seem to perceive each other as important for water provision.
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The in-degree centrality is between that of Case 1 and 3 (average in-degree centrality of 3.14, Table 4,
Case 3; see also Table A3 in Appendix A). In addition, and in contrast to the other two cases, the
national actors (blue nodes) are most clearly at the periphery. Private actors (orange node) have the
least importance in this case.
Water 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 8 of 18 
 
divided core–periphery structure (see Figure 3): one consisting of municipal actors (red nodes) and 
the other of mainly regional actors (turquoise nodes). Municipal actors in the periphery only link to 
municipal actors in the core, and regional actors in the periphery only link to regional actors in the 
core. Furthermore, regional actors also build a cluster internally linked to each other. Here we find 
that regional and local actors do not seem to perceive each other as important for water provision. 
The in-degree centrality is between that of Case 1 and 3 (average in-degree centrality of 3.14, Table 4, 
Case 3; see also Table A3 in Appendix A). In addition, and in contrast to the other two cases, the 
national actors (blue nodes) are most clearly at the periphery. Private actors (orange node) have the 
least importance in this case. 
 
Figure 3. Power in Case 3. 
Legend: Having 9 interview partners and 42 actors in this network, 378 connections are possible, and 104 were 
observed, which results in a density of 0.26. The overall density (considering all potential relations if all the nodes 
had been active) is 0.060. Red = municipal/local; Turquoise = cantonal/regional; Blue = national; Orange = private. 
In sum, we find that municipalities and inter-municipal organizations are both perceived as the 
most important across all cases (approximately 50%). As such, municipalities and inter-municipal 
organizations have the highest reputational power, regional actors have the second highest, and 
national and private actors have the least. 
3.3. Democratic Legitimacy 
All three cases have historically had strong democratic legitimacy. According to the cantonal 
law, the regional government has the formal decision-making rights and discretion to intervene at 
the local level to safeguard water supply in its territory. However, the regional government has 
delegated operational competence to the municipalities. Hence, municipal councils control the 
operational decisions about water supply when the municipality provides water (through municipal 
waterworks). Citizens have historically had a high degree of influence on the current structures, both 
indirectly by electing their municipal councilors and directly by voting on large financial projects in 
the context of municipal waterworks. Even in the case of inter-municipal organizations, the 
municipal councilors sit on the board and make decisions. However, in such arrangements, the 
citizens can no longer vote on large financial projects. In Switzerland, the legal form of joint-stock 
corporations means that the municipalities have less control than inter-municipal associations. 
Hence, a joint-stock corporation means less democratic legitimacy than inter-municipal associations. 
In Case 1, interview data indicate that the actors’ values of democratic legitimacy are the lowest, 
compared to the other two cases. That is, the interview partners do not place a high level of 
importance on having an influence on their water provision. Instead, interviewees state that the 
difficulty in deciding which competences the individual municipalities should give up and the need 
to clarify the financial redistribution are the main factors that have created barriers for reforms 
(Interviews 3, 4, 5, 8). While the former concern links to democratic legitimacy, as there is fear of 
Figure 3. Power in Case 3. Legend: Having 9 interview partners and 42 actors in this network, 378
connections are possible, and 104 were observed, which results in a density of 0.26. The overall density
(considering all potential relations if all the nodes had been active) is 0.060. Red = municipal/local;
Turquoise = cantonal/regional; Blue = national; Orange = private.
In sum, we find that municipalities and inter-municipal organizations are both perceived as the
most important across all cases (approximately 50%). As such, municipalities and inter-municipal
organizations have the highest reputational po er, regional actors have the second highest, and
natio al and private actors have the least.
3.3. Democratic Legitimacy
All three cases have historically had stro ocratic legitimacy. According to the cantonal
law, the regional government has the formal decision-making rights and discretion to intervene at the
local level to safeguard water supply in its territory. However, the regional government has delegated
operational competence to the municipalities. Hence, municipal councils control the operational
decisions about water supply when the municipality provides water (through municipal waterworks).
Citizens have historically had a high degree of influence on the current structures, both indirectly by
electing their municipal councilors and directly by voting on large financial projects in the context of
municipal waterworks. Even in the c se of inter-municipal organization , t e mu icipal councilors
sit on he board and make decisions. However, in such arrangeme ts, the citizens can no longer vote
on large financial projects. In Switzerland, the legal form of joint-stock corporations means that the
municipalities have less control than inter-municipal associations. Hence, a joint-stock corporation
means less democratic legitimacy than inter-municipal associations.
In Case 1, interview data indicate that the actors’ values of democratic legitimacy are the lowest,
compared to the other two cases. That is, the interview partners do not place a high level of importance
on having an influence on their water provision. Instead, interviewees state that the difficulty in
deciding which competences the individual municipalities should give up and the need to clarify the
financial redistribution are the main factors that have created barriers for reforms (Interviews 3, 4, 5, 8).
While the former concern links to democratic legitimacy, as there is fear of losing local competences
and responsibilities, the latter has more to do with financial fairness. This latter aspect can potentially
be better solved at the regional rather than the local level, as the higher institutional level is responsible
for deciding redistribution across subsidiary actors. Hence, this also serves as an indicator that these
actors are rather open to the involvement of actors at the regional level and place a low value on
democratic legitimacy.
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In Case 2, we find democratic legitimacy values to fall between Cases 1 and 3. This is primarily
because we find a more differentiated perception of democratic legitimacy here than in the other two
cases. The values of citizen influence and local competences remain high in the water-rich valley
municipalities, as interviewees from the valleys express concern of losing their direct control over
decision-making (Interviews 9, 11, 13, 15). Conversely, the hillside municipalities prioritize engaging
in inter-municipal coordination with the valley municipalities over direct democratic influence, to
safeguard their water supply (Interviews 10, 12, 14; see above). Overall, the hillside and valley
municipalities tend to block in each other in decision-making processes.
In Case 3, values of citizen influence and local competences are the highest in comparison to the
other two cases. Here, several interviewees state that the municipalities want to retain sovereignty
over local water supply and that citizens’ ability to influence their local water supplier is considered
a high priority (Interviews 19, 21, 22, 23). One interviewee explains that “citizens’ ability to directly
influence their local water supply is fundamental, as this water is a key public service” (Interview 21).
What is more, this interviewee continues, is that people in this area want their water to come from their
municipality and not from a neighbor or distant water supplier. Several interviewee partners were
concerned about the quality of water provided by the joint-stock company, which draws its water from
infiltrated Rhine groundwater (Interviews 19, 21, 22). Accordingly, the high priority of democratic
control alongside water quality concerns has been found to be a barrier for coordination.
3.4. Accountability
Basel-Landschaft has a range of steering tools: the ability to grant or deny concessions for
water use, issue mandates and fines, and create Regional Water Supply Plans. However, a regional
interviewee says, “The canton lacks strong policy instruments to put pressure on the municipalities
( . . . )” (Interview 3) and, hence, cannot strongly promote coordination. Moreover, instead of using
mandates and denying concessions, the region has employed weaker steering tools, such as funding
planning processes for coordination.
Overall accountability is found to be moderate in Case 1; the regional actors have neither engaged
in a planning process nor in providing subsidies or issuing mandates to coordinate. The local actors in
this case wish that the regional actors would take on a stronger steering role, as they perceive this as a
bridge for coordination. Comparatively, the capacity to steer has been the strongest in Case 2, where
the region has been more active in convening the local actors in planning processes than in the other
two cases. This has served as a bridge for coordination (Interview 1.2). Similar to Case 1, the canton
has not engaged actively in steering Case 3. However, unlike Case 1, in Case 3 the, actors are most
averse to stronger regional steering and, hence, accountability is the weakest here, which has blocked
coordination reforms.
Interviewees in all three cases have indicate that the region particularly lacks incentive-based
steering tools. They argue that strong financial incentives could serve as an important means
for the region to steer. All local actors would rather be encouraged by incentives and want the
regional government to serve as facilitators for coordination processes; they do not want the regional
government to give them mandates (Interviews 3–23).
4. Discussion
We now discuss the observed coordination in relation to the bridges and barriers of reputational
power, democratic legitimacy and accountability for our three cases.
In Case 1, we observe a moderate degree of coordination in comparison with the other two
cases, as there are both municipal waterworks and inter-municipal organizations. Our analysis of
reputational power helps to explain a lack of further coordination within Case 1: the regional actors
have the highest reputational power in this network, as the interview partners regard these as the most
important. In line with our first expectation, this form of reputational power seems to be a barrier
for coordination as the key partners for inter-municipal coordination are the municipalities, but the
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municipalities do not all regard each other as important. However, coordination by a regional actor
(that is the canton) could be an option in this region, as the regional actors are considered the most
important. Similarly, the results on democratic legitimacy show that the actors do not place a high value
on having local influence on their water provider. These actors also regard financial redistribution as a
barrier toward coordination, which can potentially be better solved at the regional rather than the local
level. Hence, it is not surprising that the interview partners find regional actors more important for
water provision than local actors. The low degree of importance placed on democratic legitimacy has
not led to a high degree of coordination, but rather a moderate degree of coordination. We thus find
inconclusive evidence for our second expectation. Finally, we turn to accountability, where we find
that the regional actors have had only a moderate steering capacity, despite the wishes of the local
actors that the regional actors take a stronger steering stance, as they regard stronger accountability as
a bridge for coordination. This positive perception of accountability for coordination supports our
third expectation.
Case 2 is the most coordinated of all the three cases, as there is one inter-municipal organization
distributing water across all the municipalities. Our analysis of reputational power helps to explain
this. While all the cases have a considerable overall density, only in Case 2, we find that a variety of
municipalities are regarded as important and connect to the core of the network. This supports our
first expectation that if fellow municipalities are considered as important for water provision, then this
is a bridge for coordination. In contrast, the coordination in Case 2 cannot be conclusively explained
by our analysis of democratic legitimacy, which we find to be moderate, due to the diverging interests
of the hillside and valley municipalities who block each other. Hence, we can neither support nor
counter our expectation. Finally, in line with our third expectation, accountability seems to be an
important bridge for coordination in this case. Accountability is the strongest in Case 2 and we observe
the highest coordination.
In Case 3, coordination is also moderate albeit slightly higher than in Case 1, as there are fewer
organizational forms. Nevertheless, several individual municipal waterworks and inter-municipal
organizations exist. Reputational power helps to explain this form of coordination, as we find a clear
core–periphery structure where municipal and regional actors only link to their peers (municipal versus
regional actors, respectively). In contrast to Case 2, there is no strong integrated core of municipal
actors in this network. This provides a negative affirmation for our first expectation, as this lack of
regarding fellow municipalities as important seems to impede coordination. Our results on democratic
legitimacy for Case 3 also support our second expectation, as we find a high concern (the highest of
the three cases) about a loss of democratic legitimacy in this case, which is a barrier for coordination.
Conversely, and in line with our third expectation, we find that accountability in terms of the capacity
to steer is the weakest in this case, which impedes coordination: the local actors in this case place the
least amount of emphasis on the value of the regional government’s steering capacity. This is also
supported by the findings on reputational power, which shows that the local actors do not regard the
regional actors as important.
5. Conclusions
The current and often highly fragmented water supply structures face different socio-economic,
technical and biophysical challenges, even in highly industrialized countries [29]. To address these
difficulties and in order to deliver water of good quality and sufficient quantities, reforms have called
for municipalities to join forces and coordinate. In this article, we focused on coordination as involving
the joining of two or more actors to provide water services. To effectively (or not) provide public
services through coordination, such reforms first need to be realized, which often depends on power
relations as well as procedural aspects such as democratic legitimacy and accountability. We have
thus addressed three central bridges and barriers in the context of coordination: reputational power,
democratic legitimacy and accountability. We then studied coordination in the Swiss water supply
sector in Basel-Landschaft via social network analysis and interviews.
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As coordination involves a redistribution of power across actors, we first argued that reputational
power matters for coordination. Put differently, if actors regard potential coordinating partners—that
is, the municipalities—as important, then this is a bridge for coordination. We indeed found that
municipal as well as regional actors enjoy the highest reputational power across our three cases and
that it is the municipal actors that have engaged in coordination. In line with our first expectation,
we found that if municipal actors responsible for water service provision regard other municipalities
as important, then they are more likely to engage in actual coordination. The negative affirmation
of this was confirmed in Cases 1 and 3. In the former, the interview partners mainly perceive the
regional actors, rather than the municipal actors, as important and we found moderate coordination.
In the latter, we found a core-periphery structure without integration of the municipal actors. Finally,
our expectation on reputational power was affirmed positively in Case 2, where a variety of actors is
regarded as important and where we found the strongest coordination.
Second, we posited that a high preference for democratic legitimacy, with strong values of local
control and influence, is a barrier for coordination. Case 3 provides the strongest evidence to support
this, as our expected negative link between local actors’ prioritization of democratic control and effects
on coordination reforms was largely confirmed. However, despite a high concern about democratic
legitimacy, Case 3 has slightly higher coordination than Case 1, where we observe low concern
about democratic legitimacy. Indeed, our other two cases provide inconclusive evidence on for this
link between democratic legitimacy and coordination: In Case 1, we found that the actors do not
prioritize democratic legitimacy, but also consider arguments of financial redistribution in the context
of coordination, which might be more aptly solved at the regional rather than the local level. Despite
low values of democratic legitimacy, we only found moderate coordination in Case 1, rather than the
expected high level. In Case 2, we found that the hillside and valley municipalities largely blocked each
other with their contrasting viewpoints on democratic legitimacy, leading to moderate legitimacy, but
high coordination. In contrast to this lack of explanatory power of democratic legitimacy as a bridge or
barrier, we found that accountability is valuable. Indeed, our third expectation was that accountability,
in terms of the region’s capacity to steer, serves as a bridge for coordination. In all three cases, our
results support the expected positive link between accountability and coordination: the stronger the
observed or desired region’s capacity to steer, the stronger the coordination. Concretely, the regional
actor serving as a convener of the local actors in planning processes is a bridge for coordination (Case
2). Moreover, local actors in all cases say that they regard positive incentives (payments) by the regional
actors as bridges for coordination. In contrast, an aversion to steering from the regional level seems to
be a barrier for coordination (Case 3). This concurs with previous studies that have found that steering
from a higher institutional level is often required to foster coordination [28].
To summarize, we have found the following bridges and barriers for coordination in this study.
Reputational power serves as a bridge, as we found that if actors responsible for water provision
regard potential coordination partners as important, then we observe a higher degree of coordination.
We have not found conclusive evidence that high democratic legitimacy (strong local values of control
and influence) is a barrier for coordination. In contrast, we have found that accountability, in the form
of vertical steering by the regional actors, serves as a bridge for coordination.
These findings from the Swiss case of water supply in Basel-Landschaft are relevant to other
federal countries where local autonomy is juxtaposed with the clout of regions (in this case cantons),
albeit perceptions of democratic legitimacy might vary between localities. Moreover, democratic
legitimacy, and particularly the value of municipal control, is not only salient in Switzerland but also
across Western Europe, where we have seen recent citizen-initiated waves of re-municipalization of
outsourced public services [34].
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Appendix A
Table A1. In-degree centralities in Case 1.
Actor Type Actor (Total n = 52) In-DegreeCentrality (Max. 8)
Regional actors
N = 14
Bureau of Environmental Protection and Energy Basel-Landschaft 6
Drinking Water Inspector of the region Basel-Landschaft 6
Bureau of Environment Solothurn 6
Drinking Water Inspector of the region Solothurn 3
Building Insurance Solothurn 3
University of Basel 3
Bureau for Military and Population Protection Basel-Landschaft 2
Industrial Works Basel (City) 2
Government of the Region Basel-Landschaft 1
Fire Inspector and Building Insurance Basel-Landschaft 1
Region Basel-City 1
Government of the region Solothurn 1
Building, Planning and Environmental Director Conference 1
Association of region Chemists 1
National actors
N = 5
Swiss National Association for Gas and Water 6
Swiss Association of Drinking Water Technicians 2
Federal Office of Food Security and Veterinary Issues 1
Federal Office of the Environment 1
Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology 1
Municipal actors
N = 26
Water network “Birstal” 7
Drinking water technicians for the joint-stock corporation regional
water supply “Birstal-Thierstein” (RWV) and Water network “Birstal” 6
Joint-stock corporation regional water supply “Birstal-Thierstein” 6
Water supply “Lüsseltal” (Solothurn and Basel-Landschaft) 5
City of “Laufen” 5
Drinking water technicians City of “Laufen” 4
Water network “Gilgenberg” 4
Drinking water technician Water supply “Lüsseltal” 3
Municipality of Röschenz 3
Drinking water technician Water Supply “Gilgenberg” 2
Municipality of Dittingen 2
Municipality of Zwingen 2
Municipality of Wahlen 1
Municipality of Liesberg 1
Municipality of Kleinlützel 1
Municipality of Blauen 1
Municipality of Nenzlingen 1
Municipality of Brislach 1
Municipality of Breitenbach 1
Municipality of Büsserach 1
Municipality of Erschwil 1
Municipality of Meltingen 1
Municipality of Fehren 1
Municipality of Zullwil 1
Municipality of Nunningen 1
Municipality of Himmelried 1
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Table A1. Cont.
Actor Type Actor (Total n = 52) In-DegreeCentrality (Max. 8)
Private actors
N= 7
Consultancy Sutter 5
Accountancy firm BDO Visura (joint-stock corporation) 2
Consultancy Holinger 2
Water technician joint-stock corporation Heinis 1
Consultancy Schmidlin und Partner 1
Consultancy Lienhard 1
Industry and Chamber of Commerce 1
Table A2. In-degree centralities in Case 2.
Actor Type Actor (Total n = 46) In-Degree Centrality(Max. 9)
Regional actors
N = 12
Bureau of Environmental Protection and Energy Basel-Landschaft 8
Region Drinking Water Inspector Basel-Landschaft 7
Bureau of Industrial Services Basel-Landschaft 2
Directorate of Finances and Church 2
Government of the region Basel-Landschaft 2
University of Basel 2
Bureau for Spatial Planning Basel-Landschaft 1
Region Basel-City 1
Regional Leadership and Civil Protection 1
Bureau of Statistics Basel-Landschaft 1
Bureau for Military and Population Protection Basel-Landschaft 0
Industrial Works Basel (City) 0
National actors
N = 6
Swiss National Association for Gas and Water 4
Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology 3
Swiss Association of Drinking Water Technicians 2
“Aqua Viva” Swiss Action Group for the Protection of Rivers and Lakes 1
Federal Office of the Environment 1
Federal Office of Food Security and Veterinary Issues 1
Municipal actors
N =21
Municipality of Niederdorf 7
Municipality of Arboldswil 6
Municipality of Hölstein 6
Municipality of Oberdorf 6
Joint-stock corporation water supply Waldenburgertal 6
Drinking water technician Joint-stock corporation water supply Waldenburgertal 5
Municipality of Ramlinsburg 5
Municipality of Waldenburg 5
Municipality of Bennwil 4
Drinking water technician of Niederdorf 4
Drinking water technician of Oberdorf 4
Municipality of Lampenberg 4
Drinking water technician of Hölstein 3
Municipality of Langenbruck 3
Association of Basel-Landschaft Municipalities 3
Drinking water technician of Arboldswil 2
Drinking water technician of Bennwil 1
Drinking water technician of Lampenberg 1
Drinking water technician of Langenbruck 1
Drinking water technician of Ramlinsburg 1
Drinking water technician of Waldenburg 1
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Table A2. Cont.
Actor Type Actor (Total n = 46) In-Degree Centrality(Max. 9)
Private actors
N = 7
Consultancy Sutter 9
Consultancy GRG 5
Consultancy Holinger 3
Accountancy firm Schneeberger 2
Aqua Plus (private partnership firm) 1
Elektra Basel-Landschaft (cooperative) 1
Industry and Chamber of Commerce 0
Table A3. In-degree centralities in Case 3.
Actor Type Actor (Total n = 42) In-Degree Centrality(Max. 9)
Regional actors
N = 12
Bureau of Environmental Protection and Energy 9
Industrial Works Basel (City) 5
Region Drinking Water Inspector Basel-Landschaft 5
Building Insurance Solothurn 2
University of Basel 2
Bureau of Environment Solothurn 1
Bureau of Industrial Services Basel-Landschaft 1
Bureau for Military and Population Protection 1
Association of drinking water technicians Basel-Landschaft 1
Region Drinking Water Inspector Solothurn 1
Government of the region Basel-Landschaft 1
Region Basel-City 0
National actors
N = 5
Swiss National Association for Gas and Water 3
Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology 2
Swiss Association of Drinking Water Technicians 2
Federal Office of the Environment 0
Federal Office of Food Security and Veterinary Issues 0
Municipal actors
N = 21
Joint-stock company Hardwasser AG 6
Municipality of Münchenstein 6
Task-specific association Waterworks Reinach Region 6
Municipality of Aesch 4
Municipality of Arlesheim 4
Municipality of Birsfelden 4
Municipality of Dornach Solothurn 4
Municipality of Muttenz 4
Municipality of Pfeffingen 4
Task-specific association Aesch, Dornach and Pfeffingen (Basel-Landschaft and Solothurn) 4
Municipality of Bottmingen 3
Municipality of Biel-Benken 2
Drinking water technician of Waterworks Reinach Region 2
Drinking water technician of task-specific association Aesch, Dornach and Pfeffingen (ZV
ADP) (Basel-Landschaft and Solothurn) 2
Municipality of Ettingen 2
Municipality of Oberwil 2
Municipality of Reinach 2
Municipality of Therwil 2
Municipality of Allschwil 1
Drinking water technician of Hardwasser AG 1
Drinking water technician of Industrial Works Basel 1
Private actors
N = 4
Consultancy Holinger 7
Consultancy Heinis AG 1
Pharmaceutical Industry 1
Industry and Chamber of Commerce 1
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Appendix B
Interviewee list
No. Actor No. of People Date
Region
1.1 Bureau of Environmental Protection and Energy Basel-Landschaft
Representatives 2 20131.2
2.1 Bureau of Environment Solothurn Representative 1 2013
2.2 Industrial Works Basel (City) 2 2014
Case 1
3 City councilor of the city of Laufen 1 2013
4 President of water network Gilgenberg 1 2013
5 President of joint-stock corporation regional water supplyBirstal-Thierstein 1 2013
6 President of waterworks Birstal 1 2013
7 Drinking water technician for the joint-stock corporation regionalwater supply Birstal-Thierstein and Waterworks Birstal 1 2013
8 President of water supply Lüsseltal (Solothurn andBasel-Landschaft) 1 2013
Case 2
9 President of joint-stock corporation water supply Waldenburgertal 2 2013
10 City councilor of Arboldswil municipality 1 2013
11 City councilor of Niederdorf municipality 1 2013
12 City councilor of Waldenburg municipality 1 2013
13 City councilor of Hölstein municipality 1 2013
14 City councilor of Lampenberg municipality 1 2014
15 City councilor of Oberdorf municipality 1 2013
16 City councilors of Ramlinsburg municipality 3 2013
Case 3
17 President of joint-stock company Hardwasser AG 1 2014
18 President of task-specific association Waterworks Reinach Region 1 2014
19 City councilor of municipality of Münchenstein 2 2014
20 President of task-specific association Aesch, Dornach andPfeffingen (Basel-Landschaft and Solothurn) 1 2014
21 City councilors of Arlesheim municipality 2 2014
22 City councilors of Muttenz municipality 3 2014
23 City councilors of Birsfelden municipality 2 2014
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